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During the last few decades, political parties in Western democracies have been undergoing 
a crisis. Particularly the party branches that are more in contact with civil society, i.e. the ‘party 
on the ground’ (Katz & Mair, 1993), appear to encounter difficulties. This becomes apparent, 
among others, from citizens’ decline of trust in parties (Dalton & Weldon, 2005) and reduced 
levels of party identification (Dalton, 2002), which have led to increased levels of partisan 
disloyalties and electoral volatility (Drummond, 2006). As such, the linkage function of parties 
is put under pressure: an increasing number of citizens no longer recognises parties as 
trustworthy intermediaries that channel their demands to government officials, and 
consequently they do not always remain faithful to a party in the ballot box. 
In this context, party members are sometimes seen as means of protection for parties 
in crisis. Despite the fact that the number of people who are full members of political parties 
has also been steadily declining in the last few decades (Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014; 
Whiteley, 2011), members keep playing a vital role for parties and for the health of 
representative democracies, particularly during election times. Although they can be a cost to 
some extent (e.g. membership administration has a financial cost and freedom of manoeuver 
is typically hampered by members’ ideological firmness), party members are mainly an asset 
for parties. Not only do they provide the party with financial resources by paying a 
membership fee, they constitute a pool of potential candidates, staff members and office-
holders and occasionally contribute to intra-party policy-making, but they also represent a 
stable voting base for the party (Scarrow, 1994). This last function is not only limited to the 
actual party members, but, to a certain extent, it is affecting also people in their networks. 
Members are known for providing a good deal of voluntary work for the party.2 This is not 
only essential for party functioning, but it also allows to transmit a party’s political values and 
ideas to those interacting with party members and, most importantly, to mobilize electoral 
support for the party during election campaigns. Even members who are not very active within 
                                                          
1 This work was supported by the Flemish Research Foundation FWO [grant numbers 1521212N, 1504113N and 
1518314N] and by the Economic and Social Research Council ESRC [grant number ES/M007537/1]. We would 
like to thank FWO and ESRC for these grants. 
2 Although not necessarily the bulk (see: Fisher, Fieldhouse, & Cutts, 2014; Scarrow, 2014, pp. 103-109; Webb, 
Poletti, & Bale, 2017). 
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the party can still act as ‘party ambassadors’, spreading the party message and indirectly 
convincing others to vote for their party (Ponce & Scarrow, 2016). 
 Because of their formal commitment to the party and their strong partisan 
identification, however, it is often taken for granted that party members always vote for the 
party they belong to. Yet, recent research suggests that small but potentially relevant 
segments of party membership bases occasionally behave disloyally by casting a vote for 
another party (Polk & Kölln, 2016). This is certainly something worth paying attention to 
because, on the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that party members tend to provide a 
‘vote-multiplying’ effect to parties (Scarrow, 1994) only to the extent that they actually decide 
to vote for the party they are member of. On the other hand, if even the most committed of 
party supporters occasionally cast a disloyal vote, it is not surprising that less formally 
committed supporters end up doing the same. In both instances, understanding the 
underlying motivations of party members’ decision to vote disloyally, helps to indirectly 
understand a much larger phenomenon, tackling the issue of increased voter volatility from 
which parties across Europe are heavily suffering (e.g. Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; 
Drummond, 2006).  
This is precisely what we will explore in this paper. After introducing the problem of 
electoral volatility, we look at intra-party cohesion at the level of the ‘party on the ground’ by 
mapping out the share of party members who cast a defecting vote in European national 
elections, and assessing to what extent disloyal voting behaviour is used as a temporary ‘exit 
option’ (Hirschman, 1970) for party members dissatisfied with their party’s functioning. We 
try to understand the factors that might lead party members to being disloyal and formulate 
hypotheses that take into account three types of factors: party leadership evaluations, 
strategic considerations and programmatic concerns, approached both as ‘push factors’   - 
referring to dissatisfaction with one’s own party - and as ‘pull factors’ - referring to 
‘attractiveness’ of competing parties. 
In order to uncover conditional effects of the political structure, we look at party 
members’ vote defection in comparative perspective, focusing on two countries with very 
different party and electoral systems: Belgium, with a multi-party, highly proportional 
electoral system, and Britain, with a (still predominantly) two-party, majoritarian electoral 
system. More specifically, we expect that programmatic concerns are of higher importance in 
Belgium, as its highly fragmented multi-party system decreases the ideological distance 
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between parties, whereas we expect strategic considerations to be of more importance in 
Britain, as its FPTP electoral system decreases the chance for small parties to win seats. After 
describing our original broad-scale surveys, we test our expectations on party members of five 
of the largest parties in Flanders (Belgium) and the six largest parties in Britain. 
As such, our research helps disentangle the commonalities and differences between 
party members in these two countries, making it a first contribution that tries to explain and 
understand party members’ disloyal voting behaviour – and volatility more broadly – in 
international-comparative perspective.   
 
2. Electoral volatility and party members 
One of the main indicators of political parties’ eroding bonds with the broader society is that 
they are suffering from high levels of electoral volatility (Dassonneville, 2012; Drummond, 
2006). Voters no longer remain loyal to one single party but instead become more ‘volatile’ 
by voting for different parties in consecutive, or even in simultaneous elections. This  
constitutes a major challenge for parties since they have to win their voters back every 
election, and because it becomes unclear which voters they actually represent and whose 
needs they have to take along in political debates (Andeweg, 2012).  
The most common indicator of electoral volatility, the Pedersen (1979) index, 
calculates the net percentage of voters who changed their vote compared with the previous 
elections3. Although the index has been criticised for not taking into account mutual 
fluctuations at the individual level4 (Katz, Rattinger, & Pedersen, 1997), an important 
advantage is that it provides a clear view of the evolution of volatility over time, allowing for 
cross-national comparisons. As shown in Figure 1, aggregate-levels of net-volatility are 





                                                          
3 For each party, the absolute difference between current and previous election result is calculated. All these 
differences are summed and divided by 2. 
4 A trend of increasing voter volatility across Europe has, however, also been suggested by individual-level 
survey-based measures (Dalton, McAllistar, & Wattenberg, 2002). 
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Source: Dassonneville (2015) 
 
 
Both contextual factors related to the electoral and party system (e.g. the sheer number of 
parties and the degree of ideological polarization within a party system) (Bartolini & Mair, 
2007; Dejaeghere & Dassonneville, 2015; Tavits, 2008), as well as individual-level variables 
influence voter volatility. One of these factors at the individual level is party identification or 
partisanship: the extent to which citizens identify themselves with a particular party. It is 
believed that party identification - and party membership as a very strong form of party 
identification - protects parties against this increased voter volatility. One of the earliest 
research traditions on voting behaviour, that of the Michigan School, focused on party 
identification as the most important explanation for the choice of a party in elections (Bartels, 
2000; Campbell et al., 1960). The basic idea is that a large share of citizens identify themselves 
as a supporter of a party and remain loyal to that party and its candidates when casting a vote. 
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Partisanship could here be considered as group belonging, comparable with social or religious 
identity.  
Although there is scholarly controversy on whether levels of party identification have 
actually decreased over time (Bartels, 2000; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; Dassonneville & 
Hooghe, 2016; Rosema, 2006), there is increasing consensus that, possibly also due to 
enhanced citizens’ critical concerns towards parties following rising levels of education and 
cognitive mobilisation (Dalton, 2007), partisanship is no longer the main factor for the 
explanation of voting behaviour. This has been at least partially replaced by more short-time 
considerations such as opinions on current topics and candidate evaluations. Thus, rather than 
exclusively relying on long-term identifications and party socialisation, citizens now tend to 
decide for which party to vote for more autonomously than in the past (Dalton & Wattenberg, 
2002; Dassonneville & Hooghe, 2016). 
Party membership can be considered as a formal and far-reaching form of party 
identification. It is formal because people formally register to become a member, pay a 
membership fee and receive a membership card, which goes beyond just identifying oneself 
with a particular party. It is also far-reaching, in the sense that party members are not only 
expected to vote for their own party, but also to encourage others to follow their lead, 
performing a ‘vote multiplying’ function (Scarrow, 1994). Van Aelst, van Holsteyn, and Koole 
(2012) labelled party members as part-time marketeers for the party. They can do so by 
canvassing people in their community in the run-up to the election, by distributing leaflets and 
other campaigning material, by expressing their support through poster display and social 
media, or by becoming a candidate themselves (Bale & Webb, 2015). In this sense, party 
members are not only relied upon for their own votes, but also for the votes of those in their 
personal and geographic environment. Moreover, although those who identify with a party 
without formally joining it can also be involved in electoral campaign activities, party members 
are much more likely to engage in ‘high intensity’ and more costly (in terms of time and 
energy) type of activities, such as face-to-face and phone canvassing, as opposed to ‘medium’ 
or ‘low’ intensity ones, such as leafletting or social media support (Webb, Poletti, et al., 2017).  
Research has shown that people join parties for different reasons (Bruter & Harrison, 
2009; Whiteley & Seyd, 1996, 1998) and that not all party members are active in the same 
way in party politics (Seyd & Whiteley, 2004; Whiteley & Seyd, 1998). However, it could be 
argued that, in general, their contribution to politics tends to go further than occasionally 
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turning out to vote, the only significant political contribution that most citizens make to 
democratic politics. Even members that are not active within the party can play a significant 
‘ambassadorial’ role in ‘spreading the party message’ by personally convincing their friends 
and relatives to vote for their party (Ponce & Scarrow, 2016, pp. 684-685). These are non-
trivial contributions considering that previous empirical studies have suggested that a small 
but nonetheless significant association exists between parties’ electoral activity and their 
electoral performance (André & Depauw, 2016; Fisher & Denver, 2009; Johnston & Pattie, 
2003; Karp, Banducci, & Bowler, 2008). Party members, in particular, are thought to make a 
difference. In Belgium, for instance, the share of party members belonging to a party the year 
before the elections appears to be a good predictor for the election result of that party in the 
subsequent year (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2012). A similar phenomenon was observed in the 
UK, although a straightforward relationship between members and obtained votes could not 
be found for all parties (Fisher, Denver, & Hands, 2006). This suggests that, although this stable 
reservoir of votes appears to be under pressure, with party membership decline being the 
major threat (Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012), party members continue to function as an 
important linkage mechanism between parties and voters, and still have a considerable 
influence on voting behaviour. 
As mentioned, however, it cannot be taken for granted that party members always 
vote for their own party. As Katz suggested a few decades ago (Katz, 1990, p. 151): although 
members tend to be more loyal than non-members, the cause of party loyalty is not 
membership per se: members are rather a ‘self-selected sample of the most loyal supporters 
of a party’. Looking at the European Social Survey (ESS) data, Polk and Kölln (2016) calculated 
that between 3 % (Finland) and 16 % (Israel) of the party members cast a disloyal vote in 
elections (see also Kenig and Rahat (2014)). The fact that a relevant share of their members 
appears to be disloyal is an additional threat for parties. Not only average voters, but even 
party members might use cues different from their partisan affiliation when deciding on which 
party to vote for. Determinants of electoral volatility among party members, the most 






3. The determinants of members voting disloyalty 
Why do party members decide to cast a vote for another party at general elections? We put 
forward three possible type of factors: programmatic concerns, party leadership evaluations 
and strategic considerations.  
A choice for a particular party at the ballot box is, first of all, influenced by 
programmatic concerns. People vote for a party because the points of view and/or the issues 
that a party emphasizes correspond with their own views and priorities (Bélanger & Meguid, 
2008; Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). Although it could be assumed that party members 
share the opinions of their party, this is not necessarily always the case. May’s law of 
curvilinear disparity (1973), for instance, posits that party members tend to be more extreme 
than the party elite (but see: Norris, 1995).  
Moreover, parties are not unitary organizations and are often informally divided in 
factions, whose influence within the party might vary at specific elections (Boucek, 2009). This 
suggests that it is not uncommon for party members to have policy preferences that diverge 
from those of the party (elite). In their empirical analysis of Canadian and Belgian party 
members, van Haute and Carty (2012) estimated the share of ‘ideological misfits’ in each party 
between 10 and 25 %. Party members with diverging views have a choice to either ‘exit’ the 
party, to remain loyal despite the divergence (‘loyalty’) or to raise their voice in order to try 
and change things (‘voice’) (Hirschman, 1970). The exit option could be realized by leaving the 
party, i.e. by giving up one’s membership, which happens indeed because of ideological 
disagreement (Wagner, 2016). It could, however, also be realized through a more temporary 
option: voting for another party, perhaps as a first step towards considering whether to leave 
the party for good.  
The distinction made by Polk and Kölln (2016) between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors is 
particularly useful for analysing the effect of programmatic concerns on vote defection of 
party members. Using a proximity-based understanding of spatial voting (Downs, 1957; 
Enelow & Hinich, 1984), when the ‘ideological incongruence’ (or distance) between a party 
member and his or her party is large, that party member might be pushed to vote for another 
party running in the election (‘push’ factor). But it might also be the case that a party member 
is highly attracted by another party since its programme corresponds quite closely with his or 
her policy preferences, leading the member to cast a disloyal vote (‘pull’ factor). Unlike Polk 
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and Kölln (2016), who only take anti-migrant attitudes into account as pull factors, we use a 
general left-right scale, looking at the absolute distance between a member’s perceived 
position and the perceived position of their own party (push factor) as well as between a 
members self-position and the perceived position of what he or she considers the most 
ideologically closer party (pull factor). We formulate two hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Party members with a large perceived distance to their own party on a left-right scale are 
more likely to cast a defecting vote (‘push’ factor) 
H1b: Party members with a small perceived distance to another party on a left-right scale are 
more likely to cast a defecting vote (‘pull’ factor) 
 
The process of personalisation of politics in contemporary democracies has received 
considerable attention in the last few decades, raising the question of whether evaluations of 
individual candidates and, more specifically, party leadership evaluations have become more 
important for voting decisions compared to the past. Empirical evidence on the effect of the 
leadership on individual vote choice has, however, been mixed. On the one hand, a number 
of studies have found support for the personalization hypothesis (Bean & Mughan, 1989; Cain, 
Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Clarke, 2004; Garzia, 2013; Lobo, 2006). Party leaders have been 
found to be particularly important in this perspective as they are often automatically 
associated with the party and, as such, have an impact on its electoral result (Balmas et al., 
2014; Wauters et al., forthcoming). On the other hand, however, traditional interpretations 
of voting behaviour in comparative studies have reached far from unequivocal conclusions on 
party leadership effects. In these studies, short-term party leaders effects have often been 
explained in terms of prior strength of party identification (Aarts, Blais, & Schmitt, 2013; 
Karvonen, 2010; King, 2002; Thomassen, 2005) concluding that leaders tend to matter more 
only where parties matter less (Holmberg & Oscarsson, 2011, p. 50)  
In the case of party members, the expectation on leadership effects might be somewhere in 
the middle. Party members are by definition those who strongly identify with their party, and 
are therefore less likely to be attracted by party leader effects. But casting a defecting vote 
might also be a tempting option, as members are more likely to be directly affected by a 
leader’s performance than average citizens and since party leaders are only temporarily in 
charge of the party. It is in any case a less radical option than leaving the party as member: 
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party members remain to some extent loyal to the party by staying on board as members (in 
the hope that one day the party leader will resign), but might once (or as long as the party 
leader is in function) cast a defecting vote (e.g. Webb, Bale, & Poletti, 2017).   
 Aarts and Blais (2011) showed that it is not negative, but only positive leader 
evaluations that are likely to matter more for voting behaviour. Thus, focusing on one’s own 
party leader evaluation, we posit that the more positive party members evaluate their party 
leader, the less likely it will be that they cast a defecting vote. 
 
H2: The more positively party members evaluate their party leader, the less likely they will cast 
a defecting vote 
 
Finally, we discuss strategic considerations. Voters might cast their vote for the party they 
prefer, irrespective of any other considerations. However, we know that sincere voting is not 
the only option. Sometimes, voters might prefer to cast their vote for a party with a better 
chance of being pivotal and influential, rather than to vote for their preferred party. They 
might do so because they believe that their preferred party will not obtain any seats, or 
because they aim to bring a particular government majority to power (Gschwend, 2007). This 
is what is usually called a strategic or tactical voting (Alvarez & Nagler, 2000; Fisher, 2004). 
We expect party members to behave in similar ways. 
Although scholars often assume that strategic voting only occurs in majority electoral 
systems in order not to ‘waste’ votes, it has recently been demonstrated that strategic votes 
can be cast also in systems of Proportional Representation (PR) (Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2012). 
Whereas in majoritarian system voters tend to strategically defect from their preferred small 
party because it is unlikely to win seats, strategic voters in PR systems mainly aim to influence 
the coalition formation by voting for large parties who have a better chance of ending up in 
government (and to weigh on the decision-making while in power). The consequence is the 
same, as in both cases smaller parties tend to be victims of strategic behaviour. We therefore 
expect members of smaller parties to be more likely to cast a defecting vote than members of 
larger parties. 
  




Individual-level variables are not the only factors influencing party switching. Institutional 
factors related to the broader political system should be taken into account as well. We 
consider two institutional aspects that are relevant for explaining disloyal voting behaviour of 
party members in particular: the party system and the electoral system. As we explain below, 
Belgium and the UK differ on both aspects, allowing us to estimate and analyse the conditional 
effects of these political system variables on the chance to cast a disloyal vote, looking at 
programmatic concerns, strategic considerations and leadership evaluations. 
We first address differences in party systems between the two countries. In a cross-
national study, Dejaeghere and Dassonneville (2015) have shown how the number of parties 
and the degree of ideological polarisation in a party system have an impact on the chance of 
voters to switch parties at election time. While the former factor has a positive effect on vote 
switching, the latter has a negative one. The reasoning behind the positive effect of the 
number of parties is that the chance to find another party that deserves a vote is higher when 
there are more parties available. Another argument is that the ideological distance between 
parties tend to be lower in systems with many parties, making vote switching more likely 
(Tavits, 2005).  
In Belgium’s highly proportional electoral system many parties compete for voters’ 
support and hence it is reasonable to expect that substantive and ideological party differences 
are smaller here than in a majoritarian country such as the UK (Bouteca, 2011; Walgrave & De 
Swert, 2007). When we look at the ‘effective number of parties’, an indicator introduced by 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) taking into account both the number and the strength of parties 
in a party system, we see that in the last UK General Election in 2015, the effective number of 
parties that obtained votes is 3.9, and this figure is reduced to 2.5 if we only take into account 
parties that obtained seats. In Belgium (as a whole), in the 2014 election these figures are 9.6 
and 7.8 respectively, much higher than in the UK (Döring & Manow, 2016). Even when we 
calculate only the effective number of parties for the regional Flemish Parliament, these are 
clearly higher than in the UK with 5.1 and 4.5 respectively. In sum, the ‘effective number of 
parties’ is larger in Flanders than in the UK, and hence we could expect that ideological 
differences with neighbouring parties are smaller. Thus, we expect that ideological 




H4: Ideological concerns are less important for party members disloyalty in Britain compared 
to Belgium 
 
Belgium and the UK also differ in the electoral system they use. While Belgium uses a flexible 
list PR-system, the UK has a single-member plurality system, also known as first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) system. This has consequences in terms of proportionality between vote shares and 
seat shares. While in a PR system the explicit purpose is to maximise correspondence between 
both shares, a plurality system first and foremost aims to create a clear and stable government 
majority based on territorial representativeness (Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1990). 
As a consequence, the level of disproportionality is much larger in plurality systems 
than in PR systems. This is confirmed when looking at the Gallagher (1991) index of 
disproportionality. For the most recent elections in Belgium (2014) this index is 4.7, while in 
the UK the score of this index is 15.0 (Döring & Manow, 2016). Larger disproportionality 
creates higher disadvantage for smaller parties and makes strategic voting more likely (Crisp, 
Olivella, & Potter, 2012; Gschwend, 2007). Moreover, a tactical vote in PR systems (which is 
rather about coalition formation) is less likely since it presupposes more voters’ knowledge: 
government and coalition formation are harder to understand and require more information 
(Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2012).5  Thus, we expect that members of smaller parties will tend to 
vote strategically more in Britain than in Belgium. 
 
H5:  Strategic considerations are less important for party members disloyalty in Britain 
compared to Belgium  
 
Finally, an expectation based on the electoral system can be made also regarding party leaders 
evaluation effect on party members vote. When looking at citizens’ voting behaviour, research 
has suggested that party leader effects exist in all systems, but they are more clearly visible in 
countries using first-past-the-post voting rules than proportional rules (Holmberg & 
Oscarsson, 2011). This is because majoritarian systems tend to put more emphasis on 
individual representatives, and specifically on leaders, whereas proportional systems are 
designed to promote parties rather than individual candidates. Moreover, contrarily to 
                                                          
5 See, however, also (Abramson et al., 2010) 
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proportional systems, in majoritarian parliamentary systems it is very likely that the most 
popular party will secure an overall majority, without the need to engage in post-election 
coalition negotiations (Lijphart, 1999). Ensuring that the leader of the party with most votes 
will become the next prime minister might work as an incentive to focus more on the leader 
in the voting calculus. We expect this may also be the case for party members voting 
behaviour.  
 
H6:  Evaluations of party leaders are more important for party members’ disloyalty in Britain 




In order to test our hypotheses, we rely on broad-scale surveys conducted among party 
members of five parties in Flanders (Belgium) and six parties in the United Kingdom. In 
contrast with public opinion or national election surveys, which are conducted among the 
entire (voting) population and only contain a small number of party members in the sample, - 
when it is even possible to identify them at all - our surveys allow us to investigate party 
members opinions and voting behaviour in detail.  
In Belgium, in the course of 2012, we conducted a postal survey among party members 
of the Flemish-regionalist party N-VA and the liberal-democratic OpenVLD, using the Total 
Design-method (TDM) of Dilman (1978). The same method was used one year later to survey 
party members of the Christian-democratic party CD&V and the ecologist party Groen, and 
again in 2015 for the social-democratic sp.a6 (See Table 1). Despite following the same 
method, response rates varied from one party to another (see Table 1). N-VA members 
recorded the highest response rate with 65.5%, whereas for OpenVLD (whose membership 
files suffered from several inaccuracies) we obtained a response rate of only 28.9%. In order 
to control for underrepresentation, the data were weighted according to sex and age 
category. 
 
                                                          
6 Apart from these five parties, there is one other Flemish party represented in parliament, i.e. the extreme right 
Vlaams Belang, but they refused to cooperate in a survey. 
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Table 1. Party members survey details, five Flemish parties 
Party Type of party N Total response 
rate 
Period: start Period: end 
Groen Ecologist 931 62.0 % 23 April 2013 16 June 2013 
Sp.a Social-democratic 583 38.9 % 10 June 2015 14 October 2015 
CD&V Christian-democratic 666 44.3 % 21 March 2013 12 June 2013 
OpenVLD Liberal-democratic 430 28.9 % 9 May 2012 9 September 2012 
N-VA Regionalist (Flanders) 990 65.5 % 3 April 2012 14 September 2012 
 
In Britain, one week after the May 2015 UK’s General Election, we conducted an online survey 
with British7 party members of the Conservative party, the Labour party, the Liberal 
Democrats, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Greens and the Scottish 
Nationalist Party (SNP) (see Table 2). YouGov, an international internet-based market research 
firm, recruited the survey respondents from a panel of around 300,000 volunteers who are 
paid a fee of 50p for completing a survey8. At the beginning of the fieldwork period, some 
8840 YouGov panellists who were party members were invited to take part in the poll, and 
5696 respondents subsequently took part in the survey, effectively a response rate of 64.4%. 
Although data are not weighted in any way since there are no known official population 
parameters for the various party memberships in the UK, data triangulation gives us 
confidence in the quality of the data 9.  
 
Table 2. Party members survey details, six British parties 
Party Type of party N Period: start Period: end 
Conservative Conservative 1192 12 May 2015 26 May 2015 
Labour Social-democratic 1180 12 May 2015 24 May 2015 
Lib Dem Liberal-democratic 730 12 May 2015 26 May 2015 
UKIP   Eurosceptic and 
Right-wing populist 
784 12 May 2015 25 May 2015 
                                                          
7 Northern Ireland party members have not been included. 
8 Upon joining the YouGov panel, volunteers complete a survey asking a broad range of demographic questions, 
which are subsequently used to recruit respondents matching desired demographic quotas for surveys. Potential 
respondents for the party member survey were identified from questions asking respondents if they were 
members of any of a list of large membership organisations, including the political parties. 
9 Previous YouGov party membership surveys using unweighted data have generated predictions for party 
leadership contests that came very close to (that is within 1% of) the final official outcome. Further validation 
was provided by comparing demographics of our UKIP sample with those generated by a far larger UKIP survey 
(n=13568) conducted by Paul Whiteley and Matthew Goodwin using a mailback method on the UKIP membership 
population. We are grateful to Professors Whiteley and Goodwin for facilitating this. 
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Greens Ecologist 845 12 May 2015 23 May 2015 
SNP Nationalist and 
social-democratic 
(Scotland) 
963 12 May 2015 23 May 2015 
Total Response rate: 64.4% 
 
The central dependent variable of our analysis is a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
or not a party member has voted for his or her own party in the last general elections (0 = vote 
for the own party ; 1 = vote for another party). This is used to run a logistic regression model. 
Only party members who casted a vote at the last general elections are included in the 
analysis. As for the independent variables, for the programmatic ‘push’ factors we rely on a 
comparison (i.e. the absolute difference) between the score of party members on a self-
placement left (0)-right (10) scale and their placement of the party on the same scale. For the 
programmatic ‘pull’ factors, we do the same, but compared to the most adjacent other 
party10. So, for instance, if a Labour member considers him or herself in a position of 4 on the 
left-right scale, and positions the Labour party at 5, the Green party at 1 and SNP at 2, the 
distance between him or herself and his or her party (i.e. Labour) will be 1 (i.e. |5 – 4|), 
whereas the distance from the most adjacent other party will be 2 (i.e. |4 – 2|)11. For factors 
related to leadership evaluations, we asked Belgian party members to express the sympathy 
they feel for their current party leader on a scale from 0 to 10. Similarly, we asked to British 
party members to express how they feel their party leader performed in the electoral 
campaign on a scale from 0 to 10. Finally, for strategic considerations, we take the size of the 
party into account, i.e. the share of votes they obtained in the last general elections (for which 
party members did (or did not) cast a disloyal vote). In order to control for the effect of other 
socio-demographic and political behaviour variables in our regression model, we also include 
sex, three age categories (15-34; 35-65; 65+), education level (graduates vs. non-graduates) 
                                                          
10 The ideological distance to the most adjacent party includes the perceived position of SNP only for members 
based in Scotland, since it is not possible to vote for the SNP in England or Wales. Ideological distance to Plaid 
Cymru, a Welsh social democratic political party, is also included in the measure for members based in Wales. 
11 If the same member were to place also the Green party at 2, there would be two most adjacent parties rather 




and level of party activism. The latter is measured with a factor score resulting from country-




We will first discuss the results of the descriptive analyses of disloyal voting behaviour of party 
members. The goal of this analysis is to map out the extent to which members cast a defecting 
vote. Next, we will present the results of an explanatory logistic regression analysis that allows 
us to test the hypotheses we formulated above. 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
Although most party members still vote loyally for their own party, it becomes apparent from 
Table 3 that both in Flanders and Britain disloyal voting behaviour is not a negligible 
phenomenon. On average, about 6 per cent of the surveyed party members did not vote for 
the party they are member of in the previous elections. At first glance, the share of disloyal 
party members seems to be higher in Britain than in Flanders but only when we take into 
account all British parties, and not only those who won the highest number of seats (i.e. 
Labour, SNP, Conservatives).  
























vote (%) – 
Britain  
Groen 7.1 5 4.0 Greens 3.8 1 15.8 
SP.A 14.2 13 7.8 Labour 30.4 232 4.9 
Open Vld 14.0 13 6.1 Lib Dem 7.9 8 12.1 
                                                          
12 The following party activities were included in the factor analyses in both countries: taken party in the selection 
of party leader, delivered leaflets, stood for office within the party organisation, helped at a party meeting and 
displaying election posters. All activities load on the same factor of party activism. 
13 I.e. the vote share for the elections of the federal House of Representatives in 2010 (2014 for sp.a) calculated 
only for the Flemish constituencies.  
14 2014 for sp.a since this survey took place in 2015.  
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CD&V 17.6 17 4.9 Conservative 36.9 331 3.8 
N-VA 28.2 27 5.7 SNP 4.7 56 3.8 
    UKIP 12.6 1 6.9 
 
Indeed, when we take a closer look at the table above, then outspoken differences between 
British parties strike the eye. Parties encountering difficulties to gain seats in Britain’s 
majoritarian electoral system (the Greens and Liberal Democrats in particular) exhibit much 
higher shares of defecting votes (15.8 and 12.1 per cent respectively, but also UKIP at 6.9) 
than mainstream parties (Conservative with 3.8 % and Labour with 4.9 %). In Flanders, we do 
not observe similar differences between small and large parties. Already from descriptive 
data, strategic voting considerations seems to be a likely explanation for these differences 
across the two countries. In Belgiums’ PR system the risk of gaining no seats is much smaller 
for minor parties than it is in Britain. Even when considering the possibility of strategic vote 
for coalition purposes, strategic voting seems to be less prevalent in Flanders, providing a first 
confirmation of our expectation as formulated in H6. 
 
5.2 Explaining party members voting disloyalty 
In the next sections, we test the possible explanations for disloyal voting behaviour in a more 
systematic way. For this purpose, we conduct a logistic regression analysis at the individual 
level, using a variable indicating whether or not a party member has voted for another party 
as the dependent variable. 
Table 4. Logistic regression for Flemish and British party members casting a defecting vote  
 Flemish parties British parties 
 B Std Err. Exp(B) B Std Err. Exp(B) 
Programmatic concerns       
Ideological distance own party 
(push factor) 
.164** .054 1.178 .159*** .046 1.172 
Ideological distance adjacent 
party (pull factor) 
-.209* .099 .812 -.109** .039 .897 
Leader evaluations       
Sympathy/Performance score 
for own party leader 
-.214*** .042 .807 -.239*** .021 .787 
Strategic considerations       
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Vote share most recent 
elections (%) 
.013 .012 1.013 -.028*** .005 .972 
Controls       
Level of education  
(ref: graduate degree) 
-.064 .181 .938 -.090 .118 .914 
 Age (ref: 65+ )       
15-34 years old -.055 .277 .946 -.327 .168 .721 
35-65 years old -.039 .207 .961 -.450** .144 .638 
Sex (ref: women) .026 .181 1.027 .063 .124 1.065 
Activity rate in the party -.757*** .126 .469 -.503*** .070 .605 
Constant -1.629 .412 .196 -.021 .321 .979 
Nagelkerke pseudo-R² 0.11   0.13   
N 2880   4924   
*** p < 0.001 ; ** p < 0.01 ; * p < 0.05 
The results (Table 4) show a highly similar pattern for Flemish and British parties. First of all, 
programmatic concerns appear to play a role in deciding to vote for another party. Both ‘push’ 
factors (i.e. the perceived ideological distance to the own party) and ‘pull’ factors (i.e. the 
ideological distance to the most adjacent party) have a significant effect in the expected 
direction on the chance to cast a disloyal vote, leading to a confirmation of H1a and H1b. In 
other words, this means that members who perceive a larger ideological distance between 
their opinions and those of their own party, and members who estimate  their opinions to be 
close to those of another party, are more likely to cast a vote for a different party than the 
party they are member of. We also hypothesised that, because of differences in the party 
system, programmatic concerns would play a larger role in Flanders than in the UK (H4), but 
the analysis gives only very limited evidence for this. The odds ratios for the ideological 
distance to the own party are almost identical for Flemish and British parties (1.178 versus 
1.172). Odds ratios for the ideological distance to the most adjacent party are slightly higher 
in Flanders than in Britain, but differences remain rather small (0.812 versus 0.897). This leads 
us to mostly reject H4. Consequently, ideological difference from one’s party  seem to play a 
role in disloyal voting behaviour irrespective of the party system in which parties operate, 
although perhaps ideological proximity to a different party than one’s own has a tiny better 
chance to cause a vote defection in a PR system such as Flanders than in a majoritarian system 
such as Britain. 
Secondly, results show that evaluations of individual candidates, and of party leaders 
in particular, also affect the chance of casting a defecting vote in a significant way. Although 
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the formulation of the questions slightly differed in Flemish and British questionnaires 
(general sympathy question in Flanders versus leadership performance question in Britain), 
the sizes of the effects are again to a great extent similar (odds ratios of 0.807 versus 0.787). 
This means that we find support for H2, stating that party members who evaluate their party 
leader more positively are less likely to cast a disloyal vote. We, however,  reject hypothesis 
H6, stating that party leader evaluations should be affecting vote disloyalty more in Britain 
than in Belgium. 
As for strategic considerations, we find that they also have an impact on defecting 
voting behaviour, but only in Britain, where party members of smaller parties have a 
significantly greater chance of voting for another party than members of larger parties. This is 
not the case in Flanders, where the vote share of the party has a small positive, but non-
significant effect. This corresponds with the findings in Table 3, and leads to a confirmation of 
H5 and only a partial confirmation of H3. 
Finally, we discuss the effects of the control variables. Not surprisingly, activity rate in 
the party has a significant effect both in Flemish and British parties: the more active party 
members are, the less likely they are to vote for another party. If party members are 
considering whether to vote for another party, they might be less active in the party’s 
campaign activities from the start. This effect is slightly larger in Flanders than in the UK (odds 
ratios of 0.469 versus 0.605). Socio-demographic variables do not have a significant effect on 
disloyal voting behaviour, except for age in the UK where people between 35 and 65 have a 
lower chance to vote for another party compared to people older than 65 years old. Moreover, 
it seems that younger people (15-34) are less likely to cast a defecting vote than the elder 
party members, given that the p-value for the coefficient is extremely close to the 5% 
conventional levels of significance (p= 0.051). Although young and less young party members 
in Belgium seem to also indicate a lower chance of voting for another party compared to over 
65, these effects are not significant. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the loyalty of party members by describing and explaining their 
voting behaviour at general elections. In light of increasing levels of electoral volatility, party 
members are often seen as a beacon of stability for parties: they generally portray high levels 
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of (formal and far-reaching) party identification and subsequently provide the party with some 
guaranteed electoral support, both by casting a vote for the party themselves and by 
persuading others to follow their lead. 
Our findings in Belgium and Britain, however, show that the loyalty of party members 
is not absolute nor unconditional. Although the great majority of party members continue to 
vote for their own party, a relevant share appears to cast a defecting vote in the ballot box. 
Our figures largely correspond with the findings of Polk and Kölln (2016) but provide greater 
detail with regards to differences between parties. In Flanders, the share of disloyal party 
members varies between 4.0 and 7.8 per cent, whereas among British parties there is more 
dispersion, with percentages ranging from 3.8 to 15.6 per cent.  
When trying to explain party members’ defecting voting behaviour, we took into 
account programmatic concerns, party leadership evaluations and strategic considerations. 
The latter only appeared relevant for British party members whose voting decisions are 
partially shaped by the incentives provided by the FPTP electoral system. The programmatic 
and leadership considerations, however, contrarily to our context-driven expectations, 
appeared equally important for both countries. Party members tend to cast a vote for another 
party when they feel that there is a large distance between their own ideological orientations 
and those of the party, or when they feel that other parties are closer to their own 
orientations. Also, when they are dissatisfied with the (performance of the) party leadership, 
party members are more likely to cast a defecting vote. In this sense, (disloyal) party members 
do not differ that much from other voters, who similarly increasingly let their voting choice 
depend on short-term factors as evaluations of party programs or party leaders, rather than 
on long-term factors as party identification and socialisation (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; 
Dassonneville & Hooghe, 2016).  
Except for strategic voting, however, these findings do not seem to vary much in a 
majoritarian two-party system such as Britain compared to a proportional multi-party system 
such as Flanders. In this sense, there is an indication that party members seem to differ from 
other voters and to be less affected by the political context. Although our research design does 
not allow us to  generalize across different electoral and party systems outside our two cases, 
we can still take this study as a first contribution in this direction. 
Moreover, although these findings do not necessarily undermine the idea of party 
members as antidote against electoral de-alignment, they contribute to qualify it. Strategic 
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considerations of British members are probably the least worrying defection for parties. A 
(defecting) member would probably cast a vote for his/her own party if (s)he were living in a 
different constituency (in the case of Britain). His or her ‘exit’ option seems to be more a 
pragmatic choice than a choice out of disappointment. This means that he or she can still act 
as an ‘ambassador’ for the party, although he or she might find it more satisfactory to do so 
in a different constituency than his or her own, either face-to-face or through phone 
canvassing, or maybe using a national platform such as the Internet.  
Excluding strategic considerations, however, in order for party members not to vote 
disloyally (and not to convince others to do so), they need to have a degree of ideological 
congruence with the direction the party is going, not to be ideologically too close to a rival 
party, and to be relatively positive about their party leaders. In other words, they need not to 
be too dissatisfied with the current state of affairs within their party. Failing these conditions, 
even a party member can cast a disloyal vote and thus jeopardize intra-party cohesion. The 
immediate danger is that a disloyal party member may convince other party supporters to 
vote disloyally. The long term danger is that, if one remains dissatisfied for long, the temporary 
‘exit option’ (Hirschman, 1970) of disloyal vote might eventually turn into a permanent one, 
through cancellation or not renewal of one’s membership, further contributing to the 
declining party membership trend.   
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